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Abstract 
Within the global garment industry, an urgent appeal is a request for action to Western 
activist groups for support in a specific case of labor rights violations. The urgent 
appeal system has become an important strategy for the transnational antisweatshop 
movement. It is distinct from the movement’s other strategies because it directly 
supports garment workers in their struggle for improved labor conditions while 
simultaneously informing and mobilizing Western consumers about substandard labor 
conditions in the garment industry. This paper explores how reflexivity in the use of 
this particular strategy, strategic choice in its implementation, and interaction with 
allies and targets affect outcomes for garment workers. It confirms the relevance of the 
emerging strategic-interaction perspective in explaining movement outcomes. 
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June 2000: the International Secretariat of the Clean Cloths Campaign (CCC)  receives 
a request for an urgent appeal (UA) concerning the British-Thai Synthetic Textile 
Company, based in Thailand. This company is a well-established supplier in the 
garment industry: it has around 1,300 workers, and produces for some 20 major 
Western brands, including Gant, Polo Ralph Lauren, and Tommy Hilfiger. In the UA 
request, the firm’s labor union and a local community-based organization, representing 
the workers, claim that management has decreased working hours, cut salaries in half, 
and dismissed a union leader while continuing to recruit new workers, and that it 
persists in these practices despite a ruling by the Thai Labour Department. There are 
also health and safety issues due to the use of chemicals for dyeing textiles. 
Apparently, the workers and their representatives have been unable to convince the 
company to redress these issues, hence their move to seek transnational support for 
their demands. The CCC International Secretariat decides to take up the request, and to 
have its country branches in the Netherlands and Germany to act upon it. They ask 
several of the company’s customers to investigate and resolve the problems. In the 
course of the events, it is decided to make the urgent appeal public: the CCC’s 
constituencies and the general public are asked to send protest letters to Gant, Polo 
Ralph Lauren, and Tommy Hilfiger, referring to their corporate Codes of Conduct. In 
response, Tommy Hilfiger conducts its own investigation, finding the allegations to be 
true; consequently it demands that the British-Thai Synthetic Textile Company 
introduce reforms. The case closes with a positive outcome for the workers, as the 
company meets their demands. (CCC Urgent Appeal database) 
This example of an urgent appeal exposes its defining characteristics. An urgent appeal 
is a request from representatives of garment workers, such as a (local) labor union or 
community organization, to Western activist groups to take action on a specific case of 
labor rights violations. If the request is taken up, the Western activist group will 
demand that the factory management, the brands and retailers that source from this 
factory, and potentially other authorities redress the violations. If made public, an 
urgent appeal becomes “a request for people to take action, usually in the form of 
protest letters addressed to the brands, employers and authorities involved, on a 
specific case of labor rights violation” (Sluiter 2009: 272). It thus directly connects 
workers and their organizations in the global garment production network (Levy 2008) 
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to Western antisweatshop activists, and through them—when the urgent appeal is made 
public—to Western publics and consumers. Figure 1 is a flow chart that summarizes the 
UA process once a request for support is received. Although the request for support is 
one stage in a longer lasting conflict at the production site, the focus of the analysis 
here is on the subsequent stages after the request has been made and taken up.  
 
Figure 1 Flowchart of Urgent Appeal Process 
 
When the CCC started to develop its UA system in the mid-1990s, it was an important 
innovation (McAdam 1983) in the antisweatshop movement’s repertoire of contention 
(Tilly 1979); according to a CCC spokesperson, it was another “experiment” to gain 
leverage over the brands and retailers in the industry.  The UA system can be conceived 
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of as a particular strategy of this movement, as it includes a distinctive set of 
interrelated decisions about tactics, claims, targets, alliances, etc. (Meyer and 
Staggenborg 2012). In the early 1990s, the movement’s support for garment workers 
depended largely on Western activists coming to visit them and their factories, 
investigating their working conditions, and campaigning around the results of their 
investigations in North America, Australia and Europe. This campaign strategy is 
essentially contentious, as it seeks to tarnish corporate reputations. It has continued to 
be important, but since the mid-1990s the movement has also been looking for other 
strategies to convince the brands and retailers in the industry to respect labor rights in 
their supply chains (Kryst 2012). Notably, the movement started to collaborate with 
brands and retailers through multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) in order to develop 
and implement labor standards and associated monitoring and verification systems 
(Bartley 2003; O’Rourke 2006), and to stimulate political consumerism and affect the 
valuation of products in the market—a form of market-based pressure (Balsiger 2010; 
Dubuisson-Quellier 2013; Sluiter 2009). In this context, the UA system was yet another 
strategy, an experimental and distinctive one that enabled the workers themselves to 
take the initiative in seeking transnational support for their causes. However, urgent 
appeals have remained outside the focus of analysis in the large body of literature on 
transnational labor solidarity and antisweatshop activism, most likely because of 
difficulties in collecting data on urgent appeals.  
We were granted access to the CCC Urgent Appeals database, in which data are stored 
on all the UA requests that the CCC adopted. Our study is unique in being able to 
comparatively analyze a large number of cases; to date, most studies of transnational 
labor rights activism have analyzed no more than a few cases at a time. The 
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in analyzing a large number of UA 
cases drawn from the CCC Urgent Appeals database, complemented with archival data 
and interviews with CCC staff, allows us to make the three following contributions.  
First, we expand the literature on the movement’s repertoire of contention by 
describing the CCC UA system in detail. Second, the database allows us to explore 
whether urgent appeals may help garment workers to improve their labor conditions. 
For example, in the case of the British-Thai Synthetic Textile Company, the outcome of 
the urgent appeal was positive for the workers, but in many other cases worker 
demands are not satisfied, or not completely satisfied. We contribute to the literature 
on movement outcomes by highlighting a series of protest cases in which protest and 
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outcome are relatively closely associated: each individual urgent appeal is characterized 
by specific labor rights violations at a particular factory that supplies a defined set of 
brands (Merk 2009; Sluiter 2009). 
Jasper (2011) asserts that because protestors rarely get what they want, it is all the 
more relevant to try understanding why they sometimes do succeed. The third 
contribution builds on this assertion, acknowledging that the task of understanding 
movement outcomes is a research problem that has generated considerable interest 
(Giugni 2008). It is increasingly recognized that, in important ways, protest is 
intentional and interactive. Movement leaders (and their opponents) make interrelated 
strategic choices regarding tactics, claims, targets, alliances, timing, etc. (Meyer and 
Staggenborg 2012), and do so in response to, in interaction with, and in anticipation of 
choices made by targets and allies (Jasper 2011). They are “reflective” (Schön 1983), in 
that such choices are not only embedded in the sequence of events around the action of 
the moment, but also informed by previous experiences and the intention to realize 
particular goals. We contribute to this emerging strategic-interaction approach by 
exploring in what ways reflexivity, strategic choice, and interaction may be relevant to 
explaining urgent appeal outcomes for garment workers. 
THE CCC URGENT APPEAL SYSTEM 
Over the past few decades, the garment industry has become highly globalized due to 
extensive outsourcing of the labor-intensive parts of the production process to low-
wage countries (Bonacich, Cheng, Chinchilla, and Ong 1994; Sassen 1988). Brands and 
retailers have increasingly specialized in design, marketing, and sales. Production is 
sourced from an extensive and complex network of suppliers, contractors, and 
subcontractors. In turn, many suppliers and (sub)contractors produce for multiple 
brands and retailers (Locke, Qin, and Brause 2007). It is a prime example of a global 
production network, in which economic production is disaggregated and dispersed to 
multiple geographic locations where wages, labor practices, and consumption patterns 
differ vastly from those where the products are sold (Levy 2008). This move from 
integrated to outsourced production has enabled the brands and retailers in this 
industry to break away from traditional labor relations (Wills 2009) and to distance 
themselves socially from responsibility over large labor forces (McIntyre 2008).  
Substandard labor conditions at supplier factories turned into a public issue in the late 
1980s.  A significant antisweatshop social movement emerged, comprising individuals 
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and organizations from various backgrounds (Micheletti and Stolle 2007). The 
movement has characteristics of a new social movement—for example, its critique of 
the thoughtless, and thereby unethical, mass-consumption in Western markets and its 
emphasis on the externalities of globalized production networks. However, its main 
ambition is to improve labor conditions for garment workers by bringing “back to the 
[transnational corporation] level some responsibility for workers no matter in whose 
employment they are or in what part of the world they live” (CCC 2000). As such, 
elements and sentiments related to the “old” labor movement (Micheletti and Stolle 
2007), with its emphasis on trade unions and labor solidarity, are blended in to the 
movement. The main challenge it faces is simultaneously to “re-establish the 
link…between brands and retailers in the North and workers in supplier factories in the 
South” (Rodríguez-Garavito 2005: 204) and to appeal to audiences in Western 
countries, for many of whom solidarity with exploited workers is not their prime 
concern. Nevertheless, appealing to these audiences and their lifestyle preferences and 
involving them in campaigns that target the reputational capital of brands and retailers 
means that consumers are turned into a “resource and an opportunity for pro-worker 
struggles” (Castree, Coe, Ward, and Samers 2004: 221). In a context where national 
public authorities were unwilling or unable to act as reliable enforcers of labor laws 
(Elliot and Freeman 2003; Rodríguez-Garavito 2005: 212), this tension stimulated the 
movement to search for ways by which it would gain leverage over the industry (cf. 
Kryst 2012): it hence developed various strategies that are both effective at the 
transnational level and appealing to its Western supporters.  
Four such strategies build on the corporate variant of Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) 
boomerang model for transnational activism (den Hond and de Bakker 2012).  They are 
complementary and partly overlapping in their recombination of elements from the 
movement’s repertoire of contention, but are analytically distinct. The contentious 
strategy seeks to affect the reputations of brands and retailers through media 
campaigns; the collaborative strategy, as in MSIs, involves working with brands and 
retailers on the formulation and implementation of labor standards that include 
certification, monitoring, and verification mechanisms; the market-based strategy 
emphasizes political consumerism; the UA system is a fourth strategy that is in direct 
support of workers in the industry. Urgent appeals are thus one strategy by which the 
movement has attempted to improve the labor conditions of workers in the garment 
industry. Table 1 characterizes the contentious, collaborative, and market-based 
approaches. Here we discuss how the UA system differs from these other three 
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strategies. Figure 2 is a graphical representation of the UA system in the boomerang 
model for transnational activism.  
Table 1 Contentious, Collaborative, and Market-Based Strategies 
Contentious Much effort has been devoted by antisweatshop groups to campaign against branded 
corporations over labor conditions in the factories in their production networks. Protest 
is aimed at affecting their reputations in Western markets. For example, the 
dissemination of “damaging information” through “leaflets, rallies, demonstrations, 
teach-ins, videos, and Websites…can undermine the [brand’s] public image or weaken its 
links with key customers” (Armbruster-Sandoval 2004: 14). Corporate marketing 
messages, brands, logo’s, and symbols, are subvertised in order to disrupt, distort, and 
satirize firms’ reputations and their dominant positions in cultures of unrestricted and 
unreflective mass consumption (Carducci 2006). Celebrity endorsement, petitions, 
demonstrations, and rallies are among the elements used in campaigning. Organizing 
boycotts has not been among the tactics used, because of the risk that it could rebound on 
the workers (cf. Turcotte, Bellefeuille and den Hond 2007).  
 
Collaborative Collaborative efforts to create labor standards were adopted in response to the 
formulation of corporate codes of conduct by brands such as Nike and Levi’s in the early 
1990s. These codes stimulated the movement to make explicit what it viewed as 
minimally acceptable, or desirable, labor conditions, as well as to take a position 
regarding issues such as (external) verification, certification, and complaint mechanisms. 
The emergence of multi-stakeholder initiatives as cross-sector collaborations to address 
the issues by mutual agreement on the setting and implementation of labor standards 
occurred in the mid-1990s, at the same time as similar initiatives were being taken in 




Political consumerism refers to the movement’s attempts to influence how consumers 
select among producers and products by encouraging them to take into account a broader 
set of valuation criteria. This strategy extends the contentious and collaborative strategies 
by politicizing the market place. Sometimes, individual choice is emphasized; in other 
instances, collective forms such as boycotting and buycotting are emphasized. Logos and 
labels are important signifiers for political consumerism (Boström and Klintman 2008). 
Balsiger (2010) reports how CCC Switzerland took the political consumerism strategy by 
staging alternative fashion shows and printing booklets and maps to inform consumers 
where clean clothes might be purchased locally. Micheletti and Stolle (2007) suggest that 
the impact of this strategy is less in actually changing consumer demand and more in 
signaling to firms that campaign claims are broadly shared, as evidenced in consumer 
polls and data on the market shares of socially or environmentally differentiated products 
(Dubuisson-Quellier, 2013). Early examples of political consumerism are reported in 
Friedman (1996), Sklar (1998), and other studies.  
 
All four strategies involve a scale shift (Soule 2009; Tarrow 2005), as violations of labor 
rights upstream of the supply chain are a reason for mobilization in Western countries. 
All four address one or more brands and retailers as a proxy target in order to instigate 
change at the local production factory, the ultimate target (figure 2). But the first three 
primarily address firms and consumers in Western markets; the ultimate target is not 
implicated in these strategies, and therefore they only have an indirect effect on labor 
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conditions. The UA system, however, is designed to include the ultimate target in the 
protest, and hence to have a direct effect. The strategy is distinctive in four respects: 
urgent appeals pose specific demands, focus on short-term outcomes, link directly to 
garment workers, and yet are responsive in nature. This combination makes urgent 
appeals attractive for the evaluation of their outcomes.  
First, each urgent appeal contains a specific demand in relation to a particular case of 
labor rights abuse, such as workers being fired for unionizing activities. 
 
Figure 2 The Urgent Appeal System as a Corporate Boomerang 
 
Note: Double-headed arrows indicate information exchange, single-headed arrows indicate pressure. The 
line of X:s indicates the impossibility to find a local solution to the conflict between the factory 
management and the workers and their representatives.  
As such, a public urgent appeal is more comparable to how Amnesty International 
regularly urges its adherents to write letters in support of individual prisoners of 
conscience than to the letter writing and petitioning that are occasionally used in 
anticorporate campaigns. Hence, and second, urgent appeals are primarily oriented 
towards achieving short-term outcomes that benefit garment workers. This is not to say 
that urgent appeals cannot have long-term, structural outcomes, but their specificity 
and focus make it less likely that any urgent appeal on its own will contribute much to 
such outcomes.  
Third, the UA system directly supports garment workers, as urgent appeals are initiated 
by the workers themselves (or by their local representatives): they decide whether and 
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when to call for international support through an urgent appeal, and they decide what 
demands will be made. This is important given the lack of attention to workers’ views 
and voices in much of the literature on the antisweatshop movement, in particular to 
how their voices are “in practice included or excluded in the processes of setting and 
implementing codes of conduct, and whether and how codes of conduct enable workers 
to organize and strengthen their voices in this and other debates” (Rodríguez-Garavito 
2005: 205). The attention to workers’ voices feeds the critique of (corporate) codes of 
conducts as merely being instruments of corporate reputation management in Western 
markets (e.g., Esbenshade 2004), and the portrayal of corporate social responsibility as 
a “continuation of the old colonial strategy of reputation management among elite 
publics at the expense of marginalized publics” (Munshi and Kurian 2005: 513). Thus, 
UA work allows the movement to show that it is not an uncritical supporter of the 
corporate project of social responsibility.  
Finally, UA work is difficult to manage, because workers decide whether and when to 
send out a UA request. It can be managed in the sense of allocating time and resources 
to UA work and deciding whether or not to lend support to particular UA requests. But 
what cannot be managed is how many UA requests are made, when, and from where. 
The UA strategy is responsive to what happens in the industry. Therefore, UA work is 
relatively unconnected to the other strategies of the movement.  
THEORIZING URGENT APPEAL OUTCOMES 
These four characteristics make urgent appeals a unique natural setting for the study of 
outcomes. Of course, explaining movement outcomes is notoriously difficult for various 
conceptual and methodological reasons (Amenta and Young 1999; Earl 2000; Giugni 
1998). Most studies of movement outcomes focus on intended outcomes in relation to 
the movement’s goals. For example, Gamson (1975) used two main outcome indicators: 
acceptance of movements as legitimate claim makers and the acquisition of new 
advantages for movements. Kitschelt (1986) added another outcome indicator, 
structural impact, which refers to the success of the movement in changing the 
structural conditions it faces. Movement outcomes may thus vary in nature and level of 
impact.  
The antisweatshop movement has achieved various outcomes at different levels of 
impact. Bartley and Child (2011) argued that these include putting the issue on the 
agenda, raising consumer awareness, engaging in dialogue with brands and retailers, 
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getting brands and retailers to accept specific standards, and having an effect on sales 
and stock prices. Others pointed out how activities of the antisweatshop movement, 
while being influential in these terms, have had only limited, partial, or temporary 
impact on the actual labor conditions for workers (Armbruster-Sandoval 2004). For 
example, critical observers of MSIs warned that only a small portion of transnational 
companies participate in them (Connor 2008) and argued that there is little evidence of 
MSIs having radically altered working conditions (Bartley 2011). In terms of Gamson’s 
and Kitschelt’s frameworks, it can be said that the antisweatshop movement has 
succeeded in becoming a legitimate claim maker and—occasionally—in obtaining 
advantages for workers, but has so far largely failed in changing the structural 
conditions in the global garment industry.  
Apart from the question of how to identify such outcomes, there is the question of how 
they are achieved. This latter question has spurred considerable debate. Two dominant 
traditions in explaining movement outcomes can be distinguished. Giugni (2008) 
argues that initially the resource mobilization perspective was used as a theoretical 
lens. It focused particularly on the strength and components of the movement 
organization and on the effects of using disruptive tactics. This tradition might be 
relevant for studying the antisweatshop movement as it employs various disruptive 
tactics, including culture jamming and the subvertising of corporate brands and logos, 
naming and shaming in the mass media, and boycotting. Since the strength of 
transnational activist networks (TANs) is a critical factor in the effectiveness of 
boomerang politics (Keck and Sikkink 1989), this points to a strong movement 
organization being highly relevant for this field as well.  
The resource mobilization tradition was criticized as being too reliant on human 
agency—as if outcomes depended only on the movement—and was consequently 
complemented with a more structural tradition. Various studies called for more 
attention to contextual factors, such as political opportunities (McAdam 1982; Amenta, 
Carruthers, and Zylan 1992). Political opportunities have been conceptualized in many 
different ways (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), ranging from those closely connected to the 
protest—e.g., access that protesters may have to members of the polity, the presence of 
elite allies—to more abstract conditions underlying the very possibility for mobilization 
and collective action. Such conditions might include, for example, legal bans on 
collective organization or mobilization, or the elite’s propensity and capacity for 
repression of protest (Koopmans 1997; McAdam 1996).  
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The political opportunities tradition suggests how movement outcomes are contingent 
on social and political factors external to the movement, such as political opportunity 
structures and public opinion (Giugni 2008). In this tradition, understanding outcomes 
of the antisweatshop movement implies looking at various nested opportunities at the 
firm, industry, country, and transnational levels (Soule 2009), as brought about by 
factors such as changes in the governance of brands, competitive positions and 
relationships, economic conditions, and media coverage (King 2008; McAteer and 
Pulver 2009).  
Several studies have been able to combine, conceptually and empirically, these two 
traditions (e.g., King 2008), and thus to address the structure-agency dualism in 
explaining movement outcomes. However, for some, such attempts still fail to address 
the more fundamental point of structural bias in these traditions, as both resources and 
opportunities are socially constructed (Goodwin and Jasper 1999). This critique 
emphasizes strategic choice and interaction (Jasper 2011; Meyer and Staggenborg 
2012), tactical innovation and adaptation (McAdam 1983), and the dynamics of 
contention (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).  
A third approach, the strategic-interaction perspective on movement outcomes, is 
emerging from this critique. It seeks to transcend the structure-agency dualism that has 
long dominated the study of movement outcomes. It proposes that resources and 
opportunities are important for explaining movement outcomes—not as explanatory 
factors in and of themselves, but in how they are reflexively and strategically used and 
played out in the interaction between challengers and targets. For example, choices 
about which tactics to use, what claims to make, which targets and alliances to select, 
and when to act are strategic in the sense that they are made in anticipation of their 
intended contribution to the realization of some objective, and even anticipate the 
reactions of others (Jasper 2004). Such choices can be made prior to the staging of 
protest, reflecting the movement’s capabilities, preferences, and previous experiences, 
but the unfolding of events during the protest is likely to be somewhat unpredictable 
and therefore the choices may be altered. Such choices are interrelated (Meyer and 
Staggenborg 2012), not only among themselves, but also with the responses and actions 
of other agents in and around protest (Jasper 2011). In this sense, movement actors are 
reflective (Schön 1983) as their choices for tactics, claims, targets, alliances, timing, 
etc., are embedded in their previous capabilities and experiences, in their ambition of 
realizing some objective, and in the unfolding of events during the staging of protest.  
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Movement outcomes are hence viewed as discrete stages in an ongoing strategic 
interaction. This may help explain why they are often temporary and transient: they 
emerge from multiple actions, reactions, and contingencies during the protest, and 
further actions and reactions and changing contingencies may compromise previous 
gains. From this perspective, some of the problems with the attribution of causality and 
with spuriousness in explaining outcomes (Earl 2000) can be seen as a consequence of 
seeking causality in factors related to resources and opportunities.  
Of course, our analysis of the UA system is not going to end the ongoing debate on how 
to explain movement outcomes. However, our analysis does contribute to this debate 
by showing how one set of social movement actors—the CCC International Secretariat 
and the various CCC country branches—has reflexively and strategically operated and 
interacted with allies and targets in developing and deploying one particular strategy to 
improve working conditions for garment workers: the UA system. We explore whether 
and how reflexivity, strategic choice, and interaction are associated with movement 
outcomes.  
RESEARCH APPROACH 
The UA database was designed for the purposes of internal coordination and 
communication between the CCC International Secretariat and the various CCC 
country branches. It is accessible to all CCC staff working on urgent appeals, both at the 
CCC IS and at country branches, but only those who are assigned a coordinator role on 
specific cases can upload information and only on the cases for which they are 
responsible. According to a CCC spokesperson, the intention of this routine is to 
enhance reliability of data. The information in the database is factual: most of the data 
are statements about what actually happened during a case, including the dates of the 
events during the case. Some are notes, intentions, or considerations about what might 
be done at later stages in the development of a case, but the distinction between facts 
and intentions is always unambiguous.  
There is, however, variation in the amount and detail of information across UA cases. 
This may be attributed to the occasional frenzy of the work: time pressure and high 
workloads may have affected how timely and with how much detail the information on 
specific cases was uploaded. Yet, given the prominent role that the local workers and 
their representatives play in the specific cases—e.g., in deciding to make cases public, in 
further pursuing cases—we expect that there is little difference in interpretation of case 
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events and their outcomes between CCC staff and the workers. Therefore, we consider 
the information that is available to be relatively trustworthy.  
The UA database comprises information on 335 cases from January 1, 1999—the start 
of the database—until October 2010. Each year, approximately 20 to 35 UA requests 
were adopted and 10 to 15 cases closed. For 161 UA cases, a closure date could be 
established. For the vast majority of the remaining cases, no outcome could be 
established. This problem of right censoring in the data is a limitation to our analysis 
but cannot be resolved as long as new UA cases are being taken up. There are further 
limitations to our data, which we detail below. However, rather than dismissing our 
analysis on these grounds, one may also appreciate the data that are available. 
In preparing the data for analysis, we routinely looked for additional information on 
UA cases by consulting the public CCC website as well as the CCC email archive, which 
contains up to hundreds of emails per urgent appeal and includes reports of 
communication with companies, allies in production countries, CCC urgent appeal 
coordinators, and other labor rights organizations involved in particular cases. The 
information found there was used in building up our database. Next, we held over a 
dozen informal interviews and discussions with three CCC urgent appeal coordinators, 
not only to better understand the UA system, but also to facilitate our data 
interpretation and analysis. We took extensive notes of these interviews and 
discussions and reviewed them during the analysis. Where deemed appropriate, we 
refer to these interviews and discussions and refer to the source as a “CCC 
spokesperson.” Finally, we comparatively scrutinized the UA cases in the database in 
order to better understand the meaning and context of particular decisions and their 
consequences.  
Our analysis of these data combines qualitative content analysis of individual UA cases 
with a statistical analysis of those case characteristics that could be meaningfully coded 
in relation to reflexivity and strategic choice on the part of CCC, and in relation to the 
interactions between the various actors involved. Table 2 captures the information that 
we retained for our statistical analysis. The information in some fields of the UA 
database could be coded in a straightforward manner, such as COUNTRY. Other pieces 
of relevant information were captured from several fields, such as TARGET—which lists 
the proxy targets in a specific urgent appeal. Some variables were calculated or coded 
from other variables. For example, DURATION—how long a UA case remained open—
was calculated from DATE RECEIVED and DATE OF CLOSURE. In addition, we used 
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data relating to the level of political rights and civil liberties for the country concerned 
in the year that the UA requests were made, to serve as a rough indicator of the 
difficulties of staging labor protests. To preserve the readability of the paper, we 
provide further information on specific variables later in the text when we feel this to be 
appropriate.  
MANAGING URGENT APPEALS: REFLEXIVITY AND STRATEGIC CHOICE 
The first urgent appeal was organized in 1996 (Sluiter 2009: 64-65). Since the late 
1990s, when the CCC hired its first UA coordinator, urgent appeals have been used on a 




Table 2 Variables 
Variable Definition Description 
ID Case identification number N=335 cases 
Date Received 
Identifies when a UA case 
started 
N=331 cases, mean=28/year 
Date of closure 




Identifies how long a UA case 
was open 
N=161 cases (105 were closed within a 
year from DATE RECEIVED; the 
shortest lasted 4 days, the longest 6 
years and 51 days) 
Country 
Identifies from which country 
a UA case was initiated 
N=330 cases, N=38 countries 
Key issue 
Identifies which is the key 
violation at stake 
N=325, see table 3 
Focus 
Identifies whether key issue in 
a UA is factory-focused or 
state-focused 
N=325 cases (factory-focused – 268, 
state-focused – 53, other – 4) 
Target  
Identifies number and types of 
proxy targets per UA 
N=198 cases with proxy targets 
(N=741 proxy targets; N=270 unique 
targets: brands and retailers – 226, 
governmental bodies – 33, other – 11) 
Multifaceted 
Identifies which types of proxy 
targets are addressed per UA 
N=198 cases (multifaceted – 77, non-
multifaceted – 121) 
Frequency 
Identifies the number of UAs 
in which a proxy target had 
been involved with prior to a 
particular UA 
N=270 unique proxy targets (highest 
number of UAs proxy target had 
previously been involved with – 24) 
Public 
Identifies whether or not a UA 
case is made public 
N=150 cases (made public – 112, not 
made public – 38) 
Minimal work 
Identifies whether the CCC 
actively worked on a UA 
N=335 cases (minimal work – 125, 
actively worked upon – 210) 
Outcome Identifies outcome of a UA 
N=163 cases (successful – 67, partly 
successful – 51, unsuccessful – 45) 
Civil Liberties 
Identifies the level of civil 
liberties per country per year 
N=155 cases for which an outcome 
could be established (rank score: 1 – 
highest, 7 – lowest) 
Political Rights 
Identifies the level of civil 
liberties per country per year 
N=155 cases for which an outcome 
could be established (rank score: 1 – 
highest, 7 – lowest) 
 
(Dent 2005: 13). The decision in early 1999 to develop a database of all the urgent 
appeals it has taken up indicates that the CCC had come to view the UA system as a 
valuable strategy in its struggle for improving the labor conditions of garment workers.  
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Building on the suggestion by Rojas, M’Zali, Turcotte, and Merrigan (2009) that 
proficiency with a particular strategy is a relevant factor in explaining outcomes, it 
might be expected that the CCC has attempted to learn from previous experiences and 
to increase the level of success for garment workers. Most of these attempts to learn are 
based on reflexivity (Schön 1983): choice in how to proceed in specific cases is based on 
deliberation, taking into account the specific context and particularities of the case at 
hand, as well as the retained experiences of previous cases (Dent 2005: 65). The 
commissioning by the CCC of the Dent (2005) study was a rare case of an explicit 
attempt to systematically evaluate and learn from the experiences so far. Strategic 
choice and reflexivity in the management of the UA system becomes evident in how the 
CCC handles UA requests: in deciding whether or not to take up the request, in 
allocating organizational capacity to UA work, and in targeting choices. Each will be 
addressed in turn.  
Selection of UA Requests 
Of the 50 to 60 UA requests CCC received each year, 25 to 40 are rejected and are, 
therefore, not represented in the database. Thus, we had to rely on secondary data and 
interviews with CCC staff to understand why the CCC adopts or rejects UA requests. 
Several of those reasons are unlikely to affect chance of a successful outcome for 
workers. For example, UA requests from Latin America are routinely passed on to the 
Canada-based Maquila Solidarity Network (MSN), the CCC’s counterpart in North 
America. This division of labor is intended to maintain a stronger link between 
production and consumption: most apparel imports into Europe originate from South 
and Southeast Asia (Sluiter 2009: 120). Other UA requests are rejected because the 
demand is not in line with the CCC’s mission to improve labor conditions and worker 
rights in the global apparel and sportswear industries (Merk 2009: 607). Whether the 
CCC has the capacity to take on another case is an important pragmatic factor, as UA 
requests are assessed in the order they are received.  
It is possible, however, that over time the CCC has improved its ex-ante expectation of 
case outcomes and has thereby enhanced its ability to reject UA requests with little 
chance of a successful outcome for garment workers. Our discussions with CCC staff 
suggests that the likelihood of a request being adopted increases if a large, well-known 
brand or retailer is involved that is based in one of the countries where the CCC is 
established. It is also more likely to go ahead if the request is supported by a union or 
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NGO with whom productive working relationships had previously been established. 
Further, some requests are not taken up by the CCC when the reported labor abuse 
cannot be verified, when there is “no convincing case to fight for” (CCC spokesperson). 
It is thus possible that the number of successful outcomes increases over time, as 
preference in their selection may have been given to UA requests that are perceived to 
more likely result in a positive outcome. Nevertheless, it was pointed out by a CCC 
spokesperson that, even if deemed to have little chance of success, some UA requests 
were still taken up for other reasons, including awareness raising among the CCC 
constituency and importance for local partners (cf. Rowley and Moldoveanu 2003). 
This latter point, as well as some considerations described later in the paper, may 
attenuate the potential bias in the selection of UA requests by the CCC.  
UA Outcomes 
We used our data to verify whether or not urgent appeal outcomes have indeed become 
more favorable for garment workers over time. We followed Dent (2005) in coding UA 
outcomes on an ordinal scale of three values: successful, partly successful, and 
unsuccessful (cf. advantages, Gamson 1975). Coding decisions were based on our 
assessment of the extent to which the demands made in an urgent appeal have been 
met. The intermediate level of partly successful urgent appeals increases the sensitivity 
of the measure. It captures the different levels on the acceptance scale that the workers 
occupy. In unsuccessful urgent ppeals, the proxy or ultimate target remains largely 
unresponsive to the request—they do not accept the activist coalition behind the 
request as a legitimate claimant—and no advantages for the garment workers are 
obtained. In partially successful cases, the targets are responsive but limited advantages 
for the garment workers are obtained. Level of success is thus defined in relation to the 
demands in the UA request. When in doubt about whether the original demands were 
met, we followed the decisions of the workers as captured in our data. If it appeared 
that they were satisfied with the outcome—e.g., because their working conditions were 
improved or because they willingly signed an agreement and trusted that the terms 
would be respected—we considered the UA outcome to be successful. However, some 
agreements remained empty promises, or were only partially implemented. We 
considered the outcomes of such cases to be partly successful or unsuccessful, 




Figure 3 Share of Urgent Appeal Success at Uptake 
Notes: The solid lines capture the upper and lower limits of the range of successfully concluded urgent 
appeals. N=163. 
UA cases are typically closed when it is decided that no further improvements can be 
obtained. Once a case is closed, no further information is added to the database. It 
might be inferred from the lack of renewed cases—i.e., an urgent appeal with the same 
ultimate target and the same labor issue—that outcomes are relatively durable and 
stable. If, for example, a previously established agreement is compromised after some 
time, CCC staff suggested that the workers’ representatives would renew their contact 
with the CCC, and a new urgent appeal would be made. This was observed once in our 
dataset. 
Figure 3 presents the relative share of successful, partially successful, and unsuccessful 
outcomes. It suggests that the range in the share of successful outcomes increased 
slightly over time, but the increase is not statistically significant. Because there is no 
information in the database about cases that are not taken up, further research into the 





Having taken up a request, the CCC varies in the amount of effort it puts into the cases. 
In reviewing the database, we noticed that 125 cases had little or no CCC activity 
associated with them. They are minimal work cases on which there is very little 
information: usually there is no closure date and no information on movement activity. 
Information about the outcome was recorded in only 22 of the 125 minimal work cases. 
In some of these cases, CCC activity only consisted of signing a protest letter drafted 
and sent out by another organization. In a larger number of minimal work cases, 
however, there was little activity at the factory level; in these cases, the workers were 
apparently insufficiently organized, or too repressed, to be able to continue the effort. 
Some UA requests from Latin America became minimal work cases when the CCC 
handed over the case to MSN after having recorded them in the database.  
Until 2005, 40-60 percent of the urgent appeals were minimal work cases. This rate 
dropped to less than 10 percent after 2007. A CCC spokesperson indicated that, 
following a recommendation from an internal evaluation (Dent 2005), the CCC became 
more restrictive in taking up UA requests. Simultaneously, more resources were made 
available for UA work; consequently, more work could be spent on cases that would 
have previously received only minimal work. This resulted in a more concentrated 
effort on the cases that were accepted. It may thus be expected that minimal work cases 
are associated with less positive outcomes for garment workers. But our data show that 
there is no significant difference in the outcomes for workers between minimal versus 
non-minimal work cases (Spearman ρ=0.050, p=0.265 single tailed, N=163). This 
result is not entirely unexpected if one considers that other activist groups in the 
movement may have spent much more time and energy on these cases than the CCC.  
Choice of Targets 
Once a request is taken up, the choice of targets is a third element through which CCC 
may influence case outcomes. Obviously, the choice is restricted to those firms and 
authorities that have a relationship with the factory. Among the non-minimal work 
cases, proxy targets could be identified in 198 urgent appeals (92 percent). Figure 4 
shows an increase in the average number of proxy targets per case. The relative share of 
multifaceted urgent appeals—i.e., cases in which more than one type of proxy target 
was addressed—also increased (from 15-20 percent before 2003 to 30-40 percent after 
2003). At the same time that the CCC took on fewer UA requests, it increased its effort 
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per urgent appeal. The increase in effort seems to follow another recommendation by 
Dent (2005) that increasing the number of, and diversity in, proxy targets would 
increase the chances of success. The appearance of multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) 
as proxy targets can be related to the increasing numbers of MSIs and the larger 
numbers of brands and retailers that have associated themselves with these MSIs.  
The choice of how many and which proxy targets to include may affect the level of 
pressure on the local factory as it potentially enlarges the circle of critics. If local 
conflict resolution is blocked, the boomerang model of proxy targeting might provide 
an alternative route for workers to resolve their cases, and targeting more brands and 
retailers makes sense to the extent that it increases the odds of at least one of the 
targets exerting pressure on the local factory. Dent (2005: 44) describes how local 
factory management might be more inclined to concede in response to joint action by 
multiple buyers than to the complaints of a single buyer, and hence advises the CCC to 
approach more proxy targets per urgent appeal.  
If different types of proxy targets are approached, the local factory might experience a 
greater diversity in the sources of pressure for change. For example, MSIs are created 
with the purpose of strengthening brands’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) efforts. 
The CCC believes MSIs can help their cause (Sluiter 2009: 153). If firms who are 
members of an MSI do indeed attach greater importance to CSR, it should follow that 
they will contribute more to the successful outcome of urgent appeals than firms that 
are not. If the MSI in question is contacted for the urgent appeal, this should further 
encourage these firms. Including an MSI as a proxy target may also facilitate the 
dissemination of the urgent appeal once it is made  
public, through the antisweatshop NGOs that are associated with the MSI. Further, 
governments, brands and retailers, and MSIs can influence one another. For example, 
corporations might put pressure on a government to implement tougher labor 
standards. Dent (2005: 64-67) recommends approaching different kinds of proxy 
targets for UA work, and governments in particular. Thus, addressing a larger number 
of proxy targets, as well as addressing different types of targets, can be expected to 
increase the chances of success, yet there appears to be no association between number 





Figure 4 Average Number of Proxy Targets per UA, for Actively Worked-upon Cases 
Notes: N = 210. 
The inconclusiveness of the result is probably related to incomplete information on the 
number of proxy targets per urgent appeal. For example, in the British-Thai Synthetic 
Textile Company case, three proxy targets were mentioned by name, whereas the 
number of brands that were actually addressed was larger; how many, and which, was 
not apparent from the database. This may have been the case in other urgent appeals, 
too. In other instances, the local factory is an exclusive producer for one or a few brands 
or retailers; in such cases there is only a limited number of potential proxy targets. 
Here, the power balance between the local factory and the proxy target is likely to favor 
the latter, because typically the brand has greater bargaining power than the factory. 
Therefore, the ratio between the number of proxy targets in an urgent appeal and the 
total number of brands and retailers that the local factory supplies might be a better 
measure (Locke et al. 2007). However, there was no information available on how 
many brands and retailers are supplied by the local factories. With increased 
transparency on the precise supply relationships in the industry, such an analysis might 
become feasible in the future.  
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Multifaceted urgent appeals are associated with slightly less successful outcomes for 
workers than urgent appeals in which only one type of proxy target is addressed, but 
not significantly so (Spearman ρ=-0.065, p=.206 single tailed, N=163). In a finer 
breakdown, however, it appears that urgent appeals in which governments are targeted 
are associated with less success than those in which governments are not targeted (β=-
0.849, p=.012, N=163). This finding is discussed later.  
The discussion above suggests that the CCC has strategically and reflexively made use 
of the UA system. The CCC can be seen as “a probing and flexible creature that 
is…innovative in continuously (or at least periodically) revising its strategies” (Lofland 
1996: 282-83). It has internally evaluated the UA system, and subsequently 
concentrated its efforts by becoming more restrictive in taking up UA requests and 
increasing the number and type of proxy targets per urgent appeal.  
INTERACTION WITH PROXY TARGETS 
A number of factors relating to the dynamics of interaction with proxy targets could be 
constructed from the data.  Specifically, we had data on the duration of urgent appeals, 
on the level of previous experience of a proxy target with the UA system, and on 
whether or not the urgent appeal was made public.  
UA Duration 
Two-thirds of the urgent appeals are concluded within a year. Yet others can range 
from a couple of days or weeks to well over a year, or even two. Duration is a complex 
indicator of interaction, not only because of ambiguity around the date of closure, but 
also because of difficulties in interpreting duration. A longer duration may indicate that 
the CCC is continuing to pursue a case in which little progress is being made. However, 
it might also be the case that some urgent appeals drag on for a long time without much 
action taking place before they are finally closed. Some UA cases are concluded within a 
short period of time, but this does not indicate lack of effort. In an internal study of the 
UA system, it was advised that, rather than taking up more urgent appeals, the CCC 
should put more effort into following up new developments in ongoing UA cases, as 
sustaining them over a longer period of time would result in more successful outcomes 
(Dent 2005).  
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Are longer-running urgent appeals associated with more successful outcomes? The 
average duration is influenced by a relatively small number of very long-lasting urgent 
appeals. We therefore recoded the duration of urgent appeals—a ratio scale measured 
in days—into an ordinal scale of deciles. Figure 5 relates the relative duration of urgent 
appeals to their degree of success; it suggests that shorter urgent appeals are more 
successful (Spearman ρ=-0.218, p=.011 double tailed, N=137). However, visual 
inspection of figure 5 also suggests that when urgent appeals run for longer periods of 
time, perseverance pays off, as the relative proportion of partially successful urgent 
appeals increases.  
Target Experience 
Within the textile industry, brands and retailers only started to develop their CSR 
departments and policies in the mid to late 1990s. In 1991, Nike and Levi’s were the 
first brands to adopt corporate codes of conduct on labor standards in their supply 
chains. Today, most well-known brands run large CSR departments, have joined MSIs, 
and often hire CSR staff in production countries (Locke, Qin, and Brause 2007). Over 
the period covered in this study, brands and retailers in the industry are assumed to 
have increasingly integrated their CSR policies into their strategic and operational 
decision making (Garriga and Melé 2004; Zadek 2004) or corporate governance 
procedures (McAteer and Pulver 2009). These changes would have enhanced their 
capacity to address the issues highlighted in urgent appeals, as they would have set up 
mechanisms to enforce the criteria contained within their corporate codes of conduct 
and would be adhering to the control and correction procedures implied in MSI 
standards. The MSI standards themselves have also been strengthened by increases in 
the number of independent external monitoring and surprise visits, and independent 
external verification (Connor 2008). But also, having been confronted previously with 
urgent appeals may have given them an impetus to strengthen their capacity to address 
the items highlighted in urgent appeals, as well as increased their understanding of how 
to handle labor disputes in the production chain (Dent 2005). Thus, brands and 
retailers that have been involved in a larger number of urgent appeal cases can be 






Figure 5  Share of Urgent Appeal Success According to Duration 
Notes: The solid lines capture the trends between the categories of success. N=137. 
We calculated how often brands and retailers were targeted in urgent appeals. The most 
frequently targeted brands are Nike (targeted 25 times), Gap (24), and H&M (21); taken 
together they represent 11.5 percent of the total corporate targets in urgent appeals. 
However, the association cannot be tested in a straightforward manner, because there 
are many cases in which multiple brands and retailers are targeted (figure 4). Typically, 
two to four brands and retailers are targeted; some of them are experiencing an urgent 
appeal for the first time, whilst others have had extensive previous experience. Having 
at least one proxy target involved with earlier urgent appeals might help assuage the 
anxieties of less experienced proxy targets and help them to overcome any reluctance to 
work on the case. This assumes, of course, that the multiple targets involved in a case 
do communicate and align their responses to the urgent appeal. A CCC spokesperson 
confirmed that in many urgent appeals there is contact among the proxy targets; 
sometimes they coordinate their responses, sometimes they argue about who is really 
responsible and who has the greatest leverage over the local management.  
In order to circumvent these complexities, we tested for two associations. We calculated 
the average number of times that the corporate proxy targets in each urgent appeal had 
previously been contacted (average experience). This assumes that each proxy target 
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has a similar impact on the outcome. This is not necessarily the case. A CCC 
spokesperson indicated that some targets have a stronger influence on the outcome 
than others, and that targets get more involved in UA work when their experience with 
the CCC grows. In this sense, in any urgent appeal the target with the most experience 
may be expected to take the lead in responding to the issues raised, and to pull the 
other targets along in the process. Therefore, for each urgent appeal we also identified 
the proxy target that had been targeted most frequently before, and used that number 
as a proxy for experience (most experience).  
Although both associations are significant (average experience: Spearman ρ=0.138, 
p=.061 single tailed, N=128; most experience: Spearman ρ=0.160, p=.036 single tailed, 
N=128), the latter association is stronger. Apparently, the most experienced targets are 
not unwilling to improve working conditions. If they were unwilling, no association 
would have been found; they would rather be looking for ways to render urgent appeals 
less effective (tactical adaptation, McAdam 1983)—for example, by supporting local 
management to increase its control over workers or insulate workers from their 
(inter)national contacts, or by adopting cut and run responses.  
Going Public 
Nevertheless, targets may differ in their willingness to respond to the demands in 
urgent appeals. In situations of prolonged non-response or denial, the workers and 
their allies may seek to escalate the conflict (den Hond and de Bakker 2007). In the 
context of urgent appeals, to make the case public is perhaps the strongest move that 
can be made to escalate the conflict. By making an urgent appeal public, the CCC seeks 
to call into question the reputation of the brands and retailers involved. It is based on 
invoking the logic of numbers (della Porta and Diani 1999) and public arousal, as the 
CCC demands its constituency and supporters to write letters to the targets of the 
urgent appeal, and seeks media coverage of the case. The decision to make a case public 
is made jointly by the CCC and local workers and their representatives, as making the 
urgent appeal public may have severe repercussions for the workers. In some cases, 
such as in China, workers eventually opposed the idea of making the appeal public 
because of fear of repercussions (CCC spokesperson).  
The analysis of the association between making an urgent appeal public and outcomes 
achieved suggests there is no difference in the level of outcome for public versus non-
public urgent appeals (Spearman ρ=-0.064, p=.506 double tailed, N=111). While this 
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result is inconclusive, it does not imply that making an urgent appeal public is not a 
meaningful step in the conflict. One can see an alternative explanation if one considers 
that the CCC will often confront the proxy target with the possibility of making the case 
public, prior to actually doing so. For some brands and retailers it might be that the act 
of going public is required for them to do anything at all. In such cases, additional 
pressure in the form of publicity might increase the chances of success. But for other 
brands and retailers the threat of negative publicity may be sufficient pressure. If the 
ploy works, the case can be satisfactorily resolved without having been made public. In 
this sense, the threat of action can be as effective as the action itself. If the ploy does not 
work, the case can be made public, and the resulting pressure may be a reason for 
brands and retailers to give in. It seems that both mechanisms are at work; threatening 
to make an urgent appeal public and making it public are both meaningful steps in 
attempting to resolve the conflict.  
Obviously, we would have liked to include in our exploration some further details about 
the decision to make a case public, such as whether or not making a case public has 
actually been used as a threat by the CCC. Although the database contains some 
information about what happens behind the scenes, there is unfortunately no 
information on the use of threats of this kind in the CCC’s communication with brands 
and retailers. Nevertheless, a CCC spokesperson says that “non-public, behind-the-
scenes” work is part and parcel of the UA system, and the explicit reference to this in 
the UA flow chart (figure 1) suggests that the threat is often made. 
It is also relevant to consider the amount of support that is garnered in urgent appeals 
once they are made public. While the effort to generate publicity is captured in the 
coding for making an urgent appeal public, the response it generates is more difficult to 
trace. Occasionally it is stated that a newspaper article or radio program has covered 
the case. In a limited number of cases from 2008 and onwards, some information is 
available on how much response has been generated: response rates include 40 to 90 
signatures from street petitioning, almost 100 text messages in a specific case, and 
anywhere between 200 to over 6,000 protest emails having been sent in various cases. 
All in all, there is too little information available on how many individuals and 
organizations supported public UAs for a meaningful analysis. Nevertheless, a CCC 
spokesperson confirms that public support as such is more important than the amount 
of public support, because targets would find it difficult to assess whether or not a small 
response may develop into more substantial support. The CCC claims it does have a 
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reputation for being able to raise full-scale international campaigns, such that even a 
relatively small number of emails, letters, or text messages represent a serious threat to 
targets. Support might be included in follow-up studies if more extensive use will be 
made of online petitioning and social media in public UAs.  
INTERACTION WITH WORKER REPRESENTATIVES 
The literature on transnational activism suggests that the strength of transnational 
activist networks (TANs) is a critical factor in their ability to make things change (Keck 
and Sikkink 1989; McAteer and Pulver 2009). Recently, Kraemer, Whiteman, and 
Banerjee (2013) pointed out that national activist networks (NANs) are also highly 
important in this respect. NANs may be especially relevant in the case of urgent 
appeals, as the CCC prefers to take up requests that are supported by labor unions or 
NGOs. Country of origin may matter for the UA process, as the institutional context of 
countries makes for variation in the extent to which they allow labor unions or NGOs to 
operate. But it also begs the question of how the CCC helps TANs and NANs to form, to 
survive, or even to flourish, as the position of labor unions or NGOs in some countries 
is very weak.  
Country of Origin 
We started addressing such issues by analyzing the countries of origin of the urgent 
appeals in the database. We recorded urgent appeals from 38 different countries, 
mostly in South and Southeast Asia. A third of the urgent appeals came from just two 
countries: Indonesia (63 urgent appeals) and Bangladesh (56). These two plus 
Cambodia (29), Thailand (27), Philippines (23), and India (22) account for two-thirds 
of all the urgent appeals in the database. There are few cases from countries such as 
China and Vietnam. There is no clear shift over time in the countries from which urgent 
appeals originate.  
A cross-tabulation of country of origin and outcome suggests that there is a statistically 
significant country effect: urgent appeals from Thailand and Bangladesh are more 
likely to be settled successfully than those from other countries (p=.021 double sided, 
N=149).  Apparently, labor conditions in these countries are such that the UA system is 
occasionally invoked; collective organization in the form of labor unions or NGOs is 
feasible, it can cross national boundaries, and a relatively large share of the urgent 
appeals are concluded successfully.  
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In order to explore these issues, we drew on the annual comparative survey of the civil 
liberties and political rights in countries compiled by the independent watchdog 
Freedom  
 
Figure 6 Number of Urgent Appeals versus Level of Civil Liberties and Political Rights in 
Country of Origin at Date Received. 
Notes: CL=Civil Liberties, PR=Political Rights. Scores are ordinal: 1 – highest, 7 – lowest. N=155. 
House. We linked UA cases to the rank score for the country in the year in which the 
urgent appeal was requested.  We propose that civil liberties and political rights are 
proxy variables to capture the abstract notion of the relative openness of the 
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institutional system (McAdam 1996), interpreted as “which players are allowed to play 
in what arenas, according to official rules” (Jasper 2011: 21).  
Figure 6 shows that most urgent appeals are from countries with modest levels of civil 
liberties and political rights (e.g., Philippines, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Turkey, as 
well as Bangladesh and Thailand for most of the years in the study). There are few 
urgent appeals from countries where levels of civil liberties and political rights are high 
(e.g., Australia, Canada, UK, Spain) or low (e.g., China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Pakistan, 
Tunisia, Morocco). This confirms the dual effect of restrictions in political rights and 
civil liberties on transnational activism: as political rights and civil liberties are 
increasingly restricted, there is an increased need for transnational activism, but the 
possibility to mobilize is reduced (Meyer 2004; Caraway 2006).  
We further explore the associations between the outcome of urgent appeals and the 
level of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) in the country of origin in the year 
the urgent appeals were requested. These associations were analyzed in ordinal 
regressions, and both are significant (CL: p=.103, N=155; PR: p=.012, N=155). 
However, the result may be subject to interaction; we therefore also analyzed the 
association simultaneously and political rights appear to be more strongly associated 
with successful outcomes than civil liberties (CL: p=.347, N=155; PR: p=.039, N=155). 
The difference between the two proxies might be understood as follows: Civil liberties 
refer broadly to tools available for collective action; in many instances what is at stake 
is gaining the right to unionize (freedom of association), something that is restricted in 
countries with moderate or low levels of civil liberties. Political rights refer to the level 
of inclusion of citizens in political processes; in countries with moderate levels of 
political rights there are some legal rights for (labor) protest. Our result is a partial 
confirmation of Locke et al.’s (2007) finding that their proxy measure of political 
opportunities—Kaufman’s “rule of law” index—was associated with increased supplier 
compliance to Nike’s requirements regarding labor-management practices and working 
conditions at the factories. 
Network Strength 
So how, then, are the strength and cohesiveness of the transnational activists’ network 
ties with the CCC established and secured? How are workers and their representatives 
able to find their way to the CCC? As is a common practice in forming and 
strengthening TANs (Keck and Sikkink 1998), the “CCC in particular has used 
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conferences, meetings and publications to work toward a shared understanding of 
campaign goals among unions and non-government organizations in Europe, North 
America, Africa, Latin America, Asia and Australia” (Connor 2008: 143). For example, 
one such meeting in 2010 in Turkey involved 230 partners from 51 countries. The CCC 
also extends its networks by organizing visits in production countries (CCC 
spokesperson). These visits are designed to allow CCC representatives to meet with 
labor organizations. During such visits, information is exchanged, the work of the CCC 
and the UA system is introduced, and the possibility for collaboration is explored. It 
may happen also that worker groups hear about the CCC or the UA system through 
their own networks and decide to contact the CCC, either directly or through an 
intermediary organization. Finally, the CCC may learn about issues through mass 
media, such as in cases of factory fire or when protesters are tried in a court, and 
contact local groups to offer support. Over time, the CCC has thus built up long-lasting 
relationships with several national and international organizations, campaigns, and 
networks.  
One might expect that the CCC would adopt a different approach to involving and 
maintaining relationships with groups from countries with differing levels of civil 
liberties and political rights, precisely because of the differences in opportunity and risk 
involved in collective action and mobilization. However, a CCC spokesperson suggested 
that this is not the case. It is decidedly easier to create and maintain a TAN when levels 
of civil liberties and political rights are higher, but the approach is similar, if only 
pursued with more caution, in countries where civil liberties and political rights are at 
lower levels.  
When such relationships between the CCC and local workers (and their 
representatives) improve and get stronger, information exchange becomes more 
efficient and effective. It may be expected that this, in turn, improves the prospect of 
positive outcomes for garment workers. Evidence from the database confirms this 
expectation. For example, among the local organizations issuing UA requests, one was 
involved in 20 urgent appeals at different factories, by far the largest number for any 
such local organization. Our data suggest that the later UA requests involving this 
organization are associated with a higher level of success than the earlier UA requests.  
On the other hand, an urgent appeal from Tunisia suggests that disruption of 
communication between the workers and the CCC can frustrate the CCC’s efforts to 
provide support. The case was about factory closure and replacement, involving 
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workers being dismissed and then rehired on worse terms of payment. After the labor 
union had staged protests, including worker sit-ins and strikes, for a period of three 
years, it contacted the CCC, which adopted the UA request. However, support by the 
CCC was blocked because, according to a CCC spokesperson, the communication 
facilities had been “pirated” by the Tunisian police, making it impossible for the CCC to 
efficiently follow up on the case. Nevertheless, the case was concluded with partial 
success for the workers, as they eventually obtained some compensation.  
It thus appears that stronger relationships between the CCC and local unions and NGOs 
are associated with more successful outcomes for garment workers. However, the 
association is not obvious, and its strength may diminish over time. A CCC 
spokesperson suggested that local partner organizations have already started to contact 
brands and retailers themselves, without resorting to the UA system. Previous 
international recognition, such as from the CCC, may have bolstered their position and 
enabled them to be recognized as legitimate claimants. A growing awareness among the 
local management of the possible impact of UA work may mean there is less need for 
them to mobilize their transnational activist network. This in turn may lead to a change 
in the set of conflicts for which support is sought from the CCC: the easier cases that 
local unions and NGOs can resolve themselves are less likely to be put forward to the 
CCC.  
Finally, it should be acknowledged that the collection of urgent appeals in the database 
may not be fully representative of the entire set of labor conflicts. Most cases originate 
from countries with moderate levels of civil liberties and political rights. Cases from 
countries with more political rights appear to be associated with more successful 
outcomes for garment workers. Arguably, issues that underlie protest are more likely to 
be discussed in situations where labor protest is considered to be legitimate than in 
contexts in which it is not. Hence, protest can have more successful outcomes for 
garment workers in these situations. In this light, the fact that workers from countries 
with low levels of civil liberties and political rights are managing to seek international 
support through UA requests and to sustain their protests over time—e.g., in the face of 
real or potential further repression and retaliation (Soule 2012)—can itself be regarded 
as quite an accomplishment. 
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INTERACTION BETWEEN WORKERS AND ULTIMATE 
TARGETS 
From the CCC’s perspective, urgent appeals may be relatively individual and discrete 
events; they come in on a particular date and—if adopted—are closed after a period of 
time. Yet, for the workers and their representatives, the act of seeking transnational 
support is a significant move in a longer sequence of conflict. However, there is only 
anecdotal evidence on the local labor conflicts. It is not possible to use this database to 
systematically assess which types of conflicts transnational support is demanded, at 
which stages in the evolution of a conflict it is demanded, or to what extent recourse to 
the UA system itself is used as a credible threat in the local conflict. Next, we present 
some evidence on the history of the local conflict prior to seeking transnational 
support. We also discuss which issues are central in the urgent appeals. 
In the Tunisian case mentioned above, there was a lead time of three years between the 
start of the conflict and the date that the UA request was recorded in the database. This 
may appear to be a long period of time, but it is not uncommon, as two further 
examples from the CCC UA database suggest.  
In a Bangladesh factory, in September 2006, a conflict arose between the workers and the local 
management, which was resolved with the signing of an agreement on wages, holidays, bonuses, 
dismissals and working hours. However, the terms of the agreement were never implemented. In 
February 2009, another conflict arose when the local management tried to force the workers to 
sign a circular that was contrary to the country’s labor legislation and the terms of the 2006 
agreement. The local management also decided to lower salaries. When the workers protested, 
management started threatening them with armed ‘goons’, sent to the homes of the workers. 
Abusive dismissals also took place. The CCC received an UA request in June 2009.  
In June 2006, a local union at Mink Tekstil—associated to the Turkish national union federation 
TEKSIF—received authorization to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement for the 120 
workers in the factory. This provoked a huge campaign against the union by the local 
management. As a result, some workers resigned from the union when they observed that union 
members were being dismissed. During the months of June and July 2006, TEKSIF filed court 
cases for 52 illegally dismissed workers. In a series of decisions in February-March 2008, the 
High Court of Appeal eventually ruled that 49 workers be reinstated and three workers 
compensated. In March 2008, the CCC received an UA request, because the management had 
not implemented the Court’s decisions.  
In these cases, there was a lead time of two to three years. In other instances, typical 
lead times were a few days or weeks in cases of accidents (factory fires) or simple 
worker dismissals, or six to twelve months in cases of union repression. All these 
examples suggest that, in many cases, when a request for support is sent out to the 
CCC, an organized group of workers is engaged in a head-on conflict with local 
management and there is little prospect of resolution. We suggest that conflicts that 
generate urgent appeals are more difficult to resolve than most labor disputes, and that 




The nature of the issue at stake is an important aspect of any UA request; it is carefully 
reported in the database, as it is the basis for the formulation of the demand(s) in an 
urgent appeal. Urgent appeals cover a wide variety of issues, such as factory fires, 
activist imprisonment, worker dismissal, and forced labor. Many urgent appeals 
concern more than one issue, but we consider the key issue to be the one that is most 
central in the demands of the UA request. For example, in one case in Cambodia, 
physical violence was used against workers in the context of union repression, so the 
key issue was coded as union repression. Table 3 summarizes the frequency of 
occurrence of key issues in urgent appeals. Cross-tabulation of key issues with 
outcomes indicates that there is no difference in the success rates associated with these 
key issues. 
Closer inspection of the key issues suggests that some relate to the factory and its 
management, such as worker dismissals, infringements of labor rights, factory closures 
and union repression. Others, such as imprisonment of workers, demands for labor 
laws, murder, and harassment of labor activists, occur outside the factory and, one way 
or another, involve the state.  We accordingly recoded the key issues into two broad 
categories: factory-focused and state-focused.  
Factory-focused appeals appear to be associated with more successful outcomes for 
workers than state-focused urgent appeals (β=0.689, p=.079 double tailed, N=163). On 
the basis of this finding it might be suggested that the UA system is more effective in 
pure corporate boomerang models, as both the cause of the underlying conflict and the 
possibility of remedying it are contained within a particular buyer-supplier 
relationship. However, once the underlying conflict extends beyond a particular 
factory, the causes are likely to be broader and more systemic, and hence more difficult 
to redress. For example, it might be expected that harassment of labor activists outside 
the production facility can only continue to take place if local authorities such as police 





Table 3 Key Issues in Urgent Appeals 
 Key Issue Frequency Percent 
Factory-focused 
 
Worker dismissal 123 37.8 
Infringement of labor rights 55 16.9 
Factory closure 45 13.8 
Union repression 29 8.9 
Factory fire 15 4.6 
Forced labor 1 0.3 
State-focused 
Demands for labor laws 20 6.2 
Imprisonment 16 4.9 
Murder 9 2.8 
Harassment of labor activist 8 2.5 




The paper set out to describe and explore the CCC UA system as a specific strategy for 
improving labor conditions in the garment industry that is not well understood in 
literature, and to analyze outcomes of its use for garment workers. Although the 
evidence is not very strong, it can be suggested that the success rate of urgent appeals 
has increased slightly over time (figure 3). Table 4 summarizes our findings. Below, we 
discuss those results that merit further reflection.  
As greater diversity in proxy targets increases pressure and might therefore be expected 
to be associated with more successful outcomes, we find it intriguing that urgent 
appeals in which government is included among the proxy targets are in fact associated 
with less successful outcomes. It may be explained in the light of our other findings that 
state-focused urgent appeals and urgent appeals from countries with lower levels of 
political rights are associated with less successful outcomes. These factors could be 
related in the sense that appeals from countries with lower levels of political rights 
(score on political rights of 5-7, t-test) are more often state-focused (p=.051, equal 
variances not assumed): government authorities are therefore included as a proxy 
target because they are implicated in the conflict. In these countries, the root causes of 
exploitative labor conditions in global garment production networks are sustained by a 
lack of labor regulations or suppression of collective action. Hence, protest is not just 
against substandard labor conditions at the factory itself, but it may also challenge the 
political context in which these labor conditions can persist. Sometimes, in such 
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circumstances, protest may sow the seeds of long-term structural change, as the 
outcome of the Stella International case in China, 2004 suggests. In this case, an earlier 
sentence on the workers, who had been involved in mass protests against bad working 
conditions at two of Stella's factories, was reversed at an appeal court. The urgent 
appeal may well have contributed to this outcome. The court decision was heralded as a 
“significant landmark in the history of the modern labour movement in China” and as 
“a milestone on the journey towards workers' rights in China” (CCC 2005). 
Our next finding is paradoxical: the outcome is more successful for garment workers if 
corporate proxy targets have greater previous experience with urgent appeals. Having 
more previous experience implies that the corporate proxy target is a repeat offender, 
but the most frequently targeted brands and corporations are also the ones that have 
developed the most extensive policies and practices to redress the issues underlying UA 
requests. This is consistent with Barrientos and Smith’s (2007) findings on the limited 
impact of corporate codes of conduct on workers, and those by Locke et al. (2007) on 
the limited impact of Nike’s CSR practices on its suppliers. It is worth exploring further 
why these brands and retailers are repeat offenders. Apparently they have a capacity for 
dealing with violations of labor rights when these are brought to light, but have been 
less successful than one might expect in addressing the root causes of the violations, as 
a genuine attempt to implement policies and practices to redress the issues underlying 
UA requests would result in fewer labor rights abuses at their suppliers and hence 
fewer UA requests involving their suppliers. That this is not the case may be indicative 
of the difficulties that Nike and similar companies face in implementing their policies; 
for instance, suppliers may produce for multiple brands and retailers, and contact 
between supplier and brand is more often through the brand’s operational 
management than through its CSR staff. In consequence, production demands may get 
higher priority than labor rights (Connor 2008). Even if it is the case that there is a 
selection bias in our study, these corporations are still repeat offenders and the finding 
remains paradoxical.  
Finally, the finding that there is no difference in the outcome between urgent appeals 
that have been made public and those that have not is a reminder of the importance of 
tactics used “behind closed doors” (den Hond and de Bakker 2007). In this case, the 
threat—unobserved—by the CCC to make an urgent appeal public is a step in the 
escalation of the conflict that is distinct from that of actually making the urgent appeal 
public—which is observed. Making an urgent appeal public can indicate that previous 
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negotiations have been unsuccessful, and can also be seen as a lever to apply further 
pressure to an unwilling corporate proxy target. The nature of this choice is such that it 
cannot be used as a straightforward predictor of outcome. This is similar to, for 
example, shareholder resolutions. Withdrawal of a shareholder resolution should be 
seen as an indicator of activist success, since management apparently has made 
sufficient concessions to satisfy the filers of the proposal (Proffitt and Spicer 2006; 
Rojas et al. 2009).  
 
Table 4 Summary of Results 
CCC Reflexivity and Choice 
 
Effects from case selection could not be tested 
 
No difference between minimal and non-minimal work cases 
 
No association with number of proxy targets per UA 
** Among proxy-targeted UAs, inclusion of government as a proxy target is associated 
with less successful outcomes 
Interaction with Proxy Targets 
** UAs with shorter duration are associated with more successful outcomes 
* UAs with longer duration have increased chances of partially successful outcomes 
** Among proxy-targeted UAs, a higher level of target experience with previous UAs is 
associated with more successful outcomes 
 No difference between UAs made public versus not made public 
Interaction with Workers 
 UAs from countries with more civil liberties are not associated with more successful 
outcomes 
** UAs from countries with more political rights are associated with more successful 
outcomes 
* Strength of relationship with CCC is associated with more successful outcomes 
Interaction between Workers and Ultimate Targets  
** UAs around key issues that are factory-focused are associated with slightly more 
successful outcomes than those that are state-focused 






The paper makes three contributions. First, it details the CCC UA system, a prominent 
example of a strategy that has also been pursued by other social movement 
organizations in the antisweatshop and human rights movements. Second, the paper 
explores the outcomes of urgent appeals for garment workers. We discussed our 
findings in the previous section. Third, the paper shows that, over time, the CCC has 
adjusted how it deals with the flow of UA requests by dedicating more resources and 
staff time to urgent appeals, and by reflecting on experience and evaluations and 
thereby attempting to improve the handling of urgent appeals—for example, by 
becoming more selective in which UA requests it takes up. Taken together, we suggest 
that reflexivity in the use of this particular strategy, strategic choice in its 
implementation, and interaction with allies and targets are all relevant for 
understanding outcomes for garment workers, which highlights the relevance of a 
“strategic-interaction” perspective on movement outcomes.  
The results of this exploration complement the findings of some of the more case-based 
and historical studies of antisweatshop activism. Carty (2006: 220) attests to the 
successes obtained in conflicts at two Mexican factories, Kukdong and Duro, although 
they were “not solved easily or quickly.” Armbruster-Sandoval (2004: 139) interprets 
the outcomes of the four case studies that he collected in several Central American 
countries as “short-term victories/long-term defeats,” thereby pointing out the 
difficulty in sustaining any concessions gained in these conflicts. Jeff Ballinger, in the 
very start of the antisweatshop movement, with his publications on Nike subcontractor 
factories in Indonesia in the late 1980s, is quoted as saying: “There has been 
tremendous accomplishment in consciousness raising on the issue of sweatshops since 
the mid-1990s…. In terms of victories, however, I think we have come up nearly empty-
handed in terms of demonstrable gains for workers” (Danaher and Mark 2003: 67). 
The focus in these and other studies is on the larger campaigns. The analysis of urgent 
appeals enabled us to focus on the micro-struggles that are part and parcel of the 
overall struggle for labor rights. The length of some of the urgent appeals, and the 
relative inconclusiveness of the findings of this study, confirm the difficulty of 
obtaining any real, long-term improvements in the labor conditions for garment 
workers.  
We further suggest that the sheer number of UA requests, and the finding that in a 
number of UA cases concessions were gained, attest to the importance of these micro-
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struggles. Focusing on the larger, more visible campaigns—as is often done in studies of 
transnational activism—and adopting a more historical-sociological perspective on the 
struggle for labor rights, tends to obscure the role of smaller, more local labor conflicts. 
Such small victories and defeats may be significant in understanding and appreciating 
overall movement outcomes (Gupta 2009). The positive interpretation is that, in the 
long run, the micro-struggles that UA cases bear witness to may help to establish 
management practices that, in the aggregate, result in structural improvements in the 
labor conditions in the garment industry.  
As we have made clear throughout our analysis, our conclusions are indicative, as there 
are some limitations to the data and their analysis. Therefore, we refrained from 
pushing our analysis beyond the bivariate correlations that we presented. Yet, we find 
the fact that a substantial number of cases do result in successful outcomes for garment 
workers to be remarkable, given various reasons why one would expect a decrease in 
the success rate of urgent appeals. After all, brands, retailers and their suppliers might 
have developed ways to counter the UA system, through repression or other disturbing 
countertactics. It is also possible that, over time, the position of local workers and their 
representatives vis-à-vis local management has been reinforced—due to previous 
transnational support in the form of an urgent appeal, for example—such that they find 
it less necessary to invoke transnational support, and thereby appeal to the UA system 
only for the more difficult cases.  
In this sense, our highlighting of the limitations of the data speaks to the study of 
transnational activism in general. It illustrates how the scale shift to transnational 
activism may not be an option that is equally available to all those aggrieved in non-
Western countries, and also—if the option is available—that there may be reasons why 
some may and others may not choose to make use of it.  
Our focus on UA outcomes for garment workers may downplay other outcomes of the 
UA system. For example, operating the UA system may in itself reinforce the TANs in 
the antisweatshop movement, and thereby contribute to the strength of the movement’s 
infrastructure and cohesiveness. Moreover, the UA system may have wider cultural and 
biographical consequences (Giugni 2008). The system reinforces the CCC’s 
organizational culture, as it motivates the organization’s staff and supporters and 
informs and reinforces its ideology. It is also a constant reminder to the CCC staff of the 
continuing and pervasive struggles for labor rights in the global production networks of 
the garment industry. Being based in the capitals of European countries, and spending 
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much of their time raising awareness among consumers and talking to and 
campaigning against representatives of Western brands and retailers, CCC staff and 
other activists in the movement highly value the recurrent contacts with workers whose 
rights are at stake. The contacts are a lasting source of inspiration and motivation, as 
well as a precious source of contacts and accurate information on labor conditions to 
fuel regular campaigning (Sluiter 2009: 265). Further, urgent appeals may have an 
additional meaning and relevance for the workers involved, beyond the immediate 
question of its outcomes. They can experience the adoption of a UA request as a 
symbolic sign of success; somewhere in the world there are people who support their 
cause, which gives them a feeling of moral justification (Dent 2005: 28).  
However, the most important implication of our analysis may relate to the study of 
movement outcomes. It suggests that, at least in the case of urgent appeals, some of the 
factors associated with the resource mobilization perspective, such as the use of 
disruptive tactics and the strength of movement organization, are not straightforward 
independent variables, but need themselves to be explained and understood in their 
context. For example, public urgent appeals might be considered more disruptive than 
non-public urgent appeals. By entering this distinction as a variable in a regression, one 
misses out on the intricacies that are at play in the decision to make an urgent appeal 
public or not. Many urgent appeals are not made public; in many cases it is decided not 
to do so, and in other cases the threat of making an urgent appeal public suffices to gain 
advantages. The use of more disruptive tactics may hence be interpreted as a sign of 
movement failure. Similarly, strength of movement organization, whether considered 
at the local, national, or transnational level, is the result of considerable and prolonged 
effort on the part of the movement, often obtained in spite of obstruction, retaliation, 
and repression. To suggest that the Tunisian case described earlier was only partly 
successful because the TAN was not strong enough is to deny that movement strength 
is in itself an outcome of interaction between the movement, its targets, and perhaps 
bystanders and allies of either the movement or its targets (as it transpired in this case, 
communication in the TAN was frustrated by the police). The notion of opportunities is 
also an insufficient explanation of UA outcomes. As we discussed above, limited 
opportunities for protest may influence what is the object of protest. Reflexivity, 
strategic choice, and interaction are thus relevant in understanding outcomes of UA 
cases for garment workers, which confirms the importance of the emerging strategic-




1 The Clean Clothes Campaign is a central player in the global antisweatshop movement, established in the 
Netherlands in 1989. It focuses on brands and retailers, consumers, governments, and garment workers 
(Sluiter 2009: 17) in order to improve labor conditions and worker rights in the global apparel and 
sportswear industries. As of 2011, it comprises a network of fifteen national coalitions in fourteen 
European countries, an international secretariat located in Amsterdam, and over 200 collaborative 
relationships with NGOs and labor unions in both developed and developing countries. 
1 Since then, other groups have adopted this strategy, too. See for example, LabourStart’s “Act NOW” 
website (LabourStart n.d.) and the Maquila Solidarity Network’s “Urgent Action” system (MSN n.d.). The 
CCC and MSN occasionally collaborate in specific UA cases. Letter writing on individual cases is also a 
well-known strategy in the human rights movement. The analysis and discussion in this paper are based on 
the CCC Urgent Appeal system. 
1 Of course, exploitative labor conditions are not unique to the current globalized garment industry, nor are 
collective action and protest against them. For example, Friedman (1996), Sklar (1998), Dickson, Loker, 
and Eckman (2009: 7-10), and others delve into some of the history of antisweatshop protest. Yet, 
structural conditions have changed such that it can be justified, in our view, to start the discussion in the 
late 1980s. 
1 Additionally, the movement works along regulatory lines. One such strategy attempts to secure the 
implementation of fair labor standards through the pursuit of social clauses in international trade 
agreements, which would set the terms and conditions of international trade (Tsogas 2001). Another is 
pursued by Global Union Federations, which strongly promote the negotiation of international framework 
agreements to co-design employment relations within transnational corporations and their global 
production networks (Fichter, Helden, and Sydow 2011). 
1 We would have liked to include information on corporate proxy targets in order to tap into the notion of 
corporate opportunities (Schurman 2004), such as how vulnerable brand and retailers are to reputation 
damage due to “retail presence, high brand value, and elastic product demand” (McAteer and Pulver 2009: 
6). Our analysis would also have benefited from the inclusion of information on the factories from which 
the urgent appeals originated (Locke et al. 2007), but again, such information was not available to us. 
1 We left out of the analysis cases from countries from which only one urgent appeal originated.  
1 Political rights refer to the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the functioning of 
government. Civil liberties refer to the freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. (For a comprehensive overview of the 
methodology, see Freedom House 2010).  
1 Further information on the case can be found on the Clean Clothes Campaign website (CCC 2009).  
1 We consider the demand for “freedom of association” to be a movement frame, rather than a key issue, as 
it is an umbrella concept that covers several of the issues at stake. It is often used as a “master frame” 
(Snow and Benford 1988) and occasionally referred to as the source of the problem, as its solution, or as 
worth fighting for.  
“Union repression” refers to all urgent appeals where the main demand is union recognition and not 
reversing dismissals or factory closure; it includes many instances of violence and intimidation. “Labor 
rights” refers to the non-observance or violation of locally relevant labor regulations, as formulated in 
national laws, collective bargaining agreements, or multi-stakeholder agreements. It is used for cases that 
do not mention factory closure, factory fire, worker dismissal, or when union members are the only 
victims. “Labor laws” refers to urgent appeals directed at governments to change laws. “Imprisonment” 
was used if the detainment was initiated by the government and not by company management as part of 
union repression. “Murder” and “harassment of labor activist” are considered to be state-focused, since it is 
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